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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF REGISTRATION OF 
DEPARTMENT OF REGULATION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 15711 
vs. 
JEFF STONE and/or LAKEWOOD 
ENTERPRISES, INC., dba NEO-
DENTURE CLINIC, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for contempt of 
court on 120 separate violations of a temporary restraining 
order wherein appellants had been enjoined from engaging in the 
practice of dentistry without a license. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a verdict of 
guilty the defendants-appellants appeal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a finding that the sentence as 1 
posed by the court below was illegally imposed and thereb; 
invalid or, in the alternative, that said sentence be remi· 
to $100.00 fine and one-half of one day in jail. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 4, 1977 this Court, in the case of s~ 
et al., v. Dept. of Registration, State of Utah, P.2d 
__ ,Supreme Court of Utah, number 14867, ruled that Sect: 
58-7-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 was constitutional and t:. 
practicing dentistry, as defined by said statute, included 
acts of offering or undertaking . . "to sup ply arti ficia: 
teeth ... or to take impressions of the teeth or jaws .. 
(i.e., "denturism")". 
On October 13, 1977 plaintiff-respondent filed a 
Petition in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County requesting a preliminary restraining order against 
appellants, alleging that they were practicing dentistry wr 
out a license as defined in Section 58-7-6, Utah Code Annot' 
1953. (R. 2-4) 
On October 4, 19 77 the Honorable Marcessus K. Sno· 
of that above entitled court issued a preliminary restrainr 
order enjoining appellants from engaging in said activityr 
set October 25, 1977 for a hearing on the matter pursuantr 
an Order to Show Cause. (R. 5-6) 
-2-
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On October 26, 1977 said matter on Order to Show 
Cause came before the Honorable David B. Dee of the same 
above entitled court whereupon the court continued the re-
straining order in full force and effect as against appellants 
pendente lite. (R. 14, 15) 
On January 20, 1978 respondent filed a Verified 
Petition alleging that appellants were in willful disobedience 
of the October 26th restraining order. Pursuant to said Veri-
fied Petition appellants were ordered to show cause why each of 
them should not be found guilty of, and punished for, contempt 
of court for violations of Section 58-7-6, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. (R. 23-25, 31-32) 
The matter was heard on February 23, 1978 by the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. 
At the termination of the hearing on February 23, 
1978, the court entered its Order as reflected by the Minute 
Entry herein adjudging the defendants guilty of contempt, and 
sentenced the individual defendant to one-half day in jail for 
each of the 120 acts of contempt found to have occurred since 
the temporary injunction entered and fining the corporate 
defendant $100.00 per act of contempt which, according to the 
Minute Entry, is sixty days in jail and $12,000.00 respectively. 
(R. 38) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ORDER OF THE COURT BELOW IS INVALID IN THAT 
-3-
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SENTENCES IMPOSED WERE CONSECUTIVE RATHER 
THAN CONCURRENT. 
The court below sentenced the individual defendar: 
to one-half of one day for each of 120 violations of its ~ 
straining order, each violation apparently representing the 
estimated 120 number of impressions undertaken by defendant1 
between the October 26th order and the February 23rd findinc 
of guilt. Since the cumulative sentence is sixty days in e. 
county jail then the sentence is necessarily consecutive ra: 
than concurrent; likewise, the $100.00 fine per corporate v~ 
lation is cumulative since the total fine imposed by the cot 
was $12,000.00. (R. 48-50, 52-53) 
All acts committed by appellants, if contemptuous, 
were closely related in time and were an accomplishment of; 
single objective, i.e., a "single criminal episode", as defi: 
by Section 76-1-401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; therefore U1 
provisions of Section 76-3-401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ar 
said provisions providing for consecutive sentences only in· 
case of felonies and contempt must necessarily be classified 
a misdemeanor considering its limitations on punishment and 
place of confinement. 
This Court in McCoy v. Severson, 118 U.502 held& 
when a person was convicted of separate crimes and several'.:' 
of imprisonment were imposed at the same time, the sentences 
were to run concurrently, in absence of a special court dire 
or statute to the contrary. 
-4-
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In Beck v. Frontier Airlines, 174 Neb. 172, 116 N.W. 
2d 281, the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled that where a series 
of acts constitutes but one contempt of one court order there 
cannot be punishment for each successive act. In Beck the air-
line had been ordered to continue flights between two cities in 
Nebraska and disobeyed the court's order. 
The most celebrated cases of this type, of course, 
involve the numerous Smith Act trials in the 1950's. In Yates 
v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 2 L.Ed 2d 95, and its progeny, 
the courts imposed a sentence for contempt for each and every 
refusal to answer a specific question by the prosecutor. In 
Yates the witness was asked eleven consecutive questions concern-
ing her knowledge of communist party membership of others and 
she refused to answer each question. The court found her guilty 
of eleven counts of contempt with the sentences to run concur-
rently. The Supreme Court overturned ten of the eleven convic-
tions, holding that a finding of contempt for more than one re-
fusal was an improper multiplication of offenses. 
The 3rd Circuit Court in u. S. v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 
held that separate refusals to comply with a court order (to 
produce documents) did not make the defendant guilty of con-
tempt for each separate refusal. 
Since contempt is a criminal offense the criterion 
for determining same is the same as for other crimes, i.e., 
-5-
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"Is the intent and objective of the contemnor divisible or: 
pursuit of one course of conduct?" That theory is followed 
the majority of jurisdictions, e.g., Codespoli v. Pennsyl~ 
418 U.S. 506, 41 L.Ed 2d 912; In Re Ward, 51 Cal Rptr 272,; 
C.2d 672, 414 P.2d 400, cert. denied 385 U.S. 923, 17 L.Ed: 
147. 
When an impulse is single, but one offense 
can be charged no matter how long the act 
may continue . . . The test is whether it 
is an individual act or acts which is pro-
hibited or the course of action which they 
constitute. If it is the course of action 
which is prohibited there can be but one 
offense and one penalty. State v. Willhote,' 
40 N.J. Sup. 405, 123 A.2d 237. 
Yet another test is articulated by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court. In Gautreaux v. Gautreaux, 220 La. 564, 57: 
2d 188, the court said the test is whether "the subsequent: 
temptuous conduct is so interwoven with previous conduct th; 
it is inseparable therefrom." At 192, 193. 
This Court held in State v. Starlight Club, 17 U.i 
174, 177 that three successive fines of $2,500.00 (the maxi: 
under the statute) imposed against a private liquor club fo; 
three illegal sales of liquor on successive Friday nights tel 
same undercover police team was excessive and this Court rer:' 
the sentence to one fine of $2,500.00 only, and in doing so 
that the three undercover purchases of liquor, each seven da 
apart, were really "one episode designed to terminate defenc 
charter, remove what someone thought to have been a loose or 
ation in violation of the statute, and that really but oner_ 
-6-
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not three, was accomplished." 
In the instant case we have acts, found to be con-
temptuous, which were carried out day after day in one ongoing 
business routine. The State did not prove 120 acts or three 
acts or 1,000 acts . only one 120-day period of noncompli-
ance. If the acts of appellants are in fact contemptuous, then 
the fine of $100.00 and a one-half day's jail sentence, total, 
are sufficient and anything more is excessive. 
Under any of the tests articulated by this Court or 
the other courts cited above, appellants have followed but one 
continuous course of conduct; one 120-day "act" of conducting 
a business inviolate (as defined) of the existing business re-
gulations of the state, conduct which was in pursuit of one 
business objective at all times and consisted of the same type 
of conduct on the first day following the order as it did on 
the ll9th day following the order. 
POINT II 
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON APPELLANT IS EXCESSIVE 
IN THAT IT BEARS NO REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO 
THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE. 
For practicing his trade, i.e., "denturism", if found 
by the courts to amount to a violation of Section 58-7-6, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, appellant Stone presumably could serve up 
to six months in jail; however, it is ludicrous to assume that 
such a sentence would be imposed in light of today's sentencing 
standards which normally call for suspended sentences for first 
-7-
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offenders even in felony cases. Misdemeanor offenses invol 
steal th, even violence, seldom result in jail sentences bei· 
actually served. 
In the instant case appellant Stone has hanging 0 
his head a 60-day jail sentence for attempting to pursue a 
mon occupation of life; conduct which the State failed to s' 
was injurious to the public heal th or welfare, indeed, not 
complaining patient was brought forward nor was any evidencc 
negligent or sub-standard workmanship on dentures. 
In addition to appellant Stone's impending incarc: 
ation there exists an imposed fine of $12, 000. 00 on a corpo: 
appellant which, in reality, is a fledgling business with 1: 
resources. 
In reality the court has imposed these stiff sent: 
for violating the order of the court. Both the United Stat: 
Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have realized that 
must be a limit to the courts' discretion in punishing cont! 
In contempt proceedings courts should never 
exercise more than the least possible power 
adequate to the end proposal. United States 
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 91 L. 
Ed 884. 
This Court, in Harris v. Harris, 14 U.2d 96, 377: 
1007, held that 30 days in jail was an excessive penalty wh: 
a contemnor father had paid only $60. 00 per month of a $10~ 
per month child support decree. This Court admonished the· 
courts of this State to exercise their power to punish for 
tempt "within the confines of reason and justice." At 100. 
-8-
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Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized 
the need for restraint when punishing contemnors. That court, 
in Shotkin v. Atchison, T & S.F.R.R. Co., 235 P.2d 990, held 
a 60-day jail sentence and a $1000 fine to be excessive where 
the contemnor had disobeyed an order enjoining him from in-
stituting any further legal actions in court. The court strongly 
advised the state's trial courts to take all the circumstances 
of each case into account before sentencing for contempt con-
victions and that the punishment should be reasonably related 
to the gravity of the offense. 
In a Georgia case a father had been punished for 238 
separate acts of contempt, one for each day he kept his daughter 
out of the jurisdiction. The court held that even if each day 
could be separately punished, the total could not be excessive. 
(Kenimer v. State, 81 Ga. App. 437, 59 S.E. 2d 296.) 
These appellants were not operating a fly-by-night 
quackery. This Court in the first Stone v. State case (supra) 
acknowledged that the appellant Stone was probably better trained 
to make dentures than a dentist. Appellants here are not asking 
this Court to consider whether the practice of denturism violates 
the statute but rather to consider whether the court below has 
exercised its power unreasonably in sentencing the appellant in 
this case in a manner which does not relate to the gravity of 
the offense committed by them. 
-9-
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CONCLUSION 
At issue is whether a judge in a trial court sitti 
in Utah may sentence a contemnor for each individual act of 
contempt comrni tted in furtherance of one single, albeit len. 
criminal episode or continuous course of contemptuous condu 
with one single objective. The majority of courts, includi: 
this Court, seem to say that such a multiplicity of penalti 
is invalid and therefore the sentence in the instant casem 
be vacated or, in the al terna ti ve, remitted to a sentence be 
a more reasonable relationship to the gravity of the offense 
involved. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of May, 1978, 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
Attorney for Appel~s 
{t;)ct' / 
LONI F. 
Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and co 
rect copies of the foregoing personally to the office of ue 
Utah Attorney General on this 11th day of May, 1978. 
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